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ABSTRACT
Inspections play a key role in keeping vessels safe. Inspection authorities
employ diﬀerent policies to decide which vessels to inspect, including
type of vessel, age, and ﬂag. Attention for vessel history is usually
restricted only to past detentions. This paper demonstrates that the
correlation between the probabilities of detention and (very serious
and serious) incidents is very low and that proactive prevention of future
incidents is improved by accounting for both risk dimensions, that is, by
combining past incident and detention information for targeting high-
risk vessels for inspection. Five combined methods are presented to
classify vessels based on these two risk dimensions, each of which
involves extensive sets of factors. These combined classiﬁcation methods
have predictive power for future incidents. Depending on the applied
inspection rate, incorporation of incident risk improves inspection hit
rates for vessels with future incidents by 30–50% compared to using only
detention information. It is recommended to focus on vessels where
both risks are relatively high. A practical example shows how the meth-
ods can be applied for inspection selection and for prioritizing inspection
areas deﬁned in terms of eight risk domains that include collisions,
groundings, engine and hull failures, loss of life, ﬁre, and pollution.
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1. Introduction
Although declining trends in detention and incident rates indicate better safety quality of vessels,
there is still ample space for further improvement. It is particularly important that high-risk
vessels are targeted for port state control (PSC) inspections to reduce so-called false-negative
events. Such an event occurs if the inspection regime does not select a vessel for inspection
because the employed targeting method indicates the vessel has low risk, whereas brieﬂy after-
wards it experiences an incident with serious consequences.
Current targeting protocols used by various Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) for PSC’s
mostly focus on detentions only. These protocols assume that detained vessels also have a high
risk of future incidents. Notwithstanding the importance of detentions and solving deﬁciencies,
the ultimate goal of inspections and detentions is not so much to prevent future detentions but to
increase maritime safety by preventing future incidents. The research question studied in this
paper is whether, by combining the two dimensions of detention risk and incident risk, PSCs can
improve their chance to select those vessels for inspection that have the highest risk of future very
serious and serious (VSS) incidents. This question is analyzed by comparing the targeting
performance of a benchmark policy based on detention risk alone with four alternative methods,
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one of which is based on incident risk alone, whereas the other three consist of various
combinations (maximum, minimum, or average) of detention and incident risk. Another purpose
of this paper is to help PSCs in ranking priorities across eight risk domains during their
inspections: collisions, drift grounding, powered grounding, main engine failure, hull failure,
loss of life, ﬁre and explosion, and pollution.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper uses worldwide data from various sources
including inspection data, ship-particular data, and incident data. Detention risk is found to be
unrelated to past VSS incidents, to decrease with past inspections, and to increase with past
detentions. The risk of VSS incidents is found to be unrelated to past inspections and past
detentions and positively related to past VSS incidents. These results indicate that current
inspection and detention policies do not relate well to incident risk. It is shown that the proposed
alternative methods outperform the benchmark policy based on detentions alone. By incorporat-
ing incident risk in their targeting policies, PSCs can reduce their chance to miss vessels that have
low detention risk but high incident risk. In practice, the fully data-driven approach presented
here should be used in conjunction with expert knowledge and intelligence sources for guiding
inspection decisions to reduce the risk of missing risky vessels.
We mention some related literature. Cariou, Mejia, and Wolﬀ (2007), (2008) report positive
safety impacts of PSC inspections and ﬁnd that deﬁciencies are related mainly to type of vessel,
age, and ﬂag of registry. Emecen-Kara and Oksas (2016) give a comparative overview of inspec-
tions, detentions, and deﬁciencies for the various MoU for PSCs. The Paris MoU (2014, 2019)
classiﬁes risk proﬁles of vessels as high, standard, or low, based on age class, ﬂag, performance of
recognized organization and ISM company, and past inspections, deﬁciencies, and detentions.
Yang, Wang, and Li (2013) discuss the importance of risk quantiﬁcation to replace reactive
policies by proactive ones. AMSA is currently the only maritime administration that uses an
explicit statistical model for risk assessment (Mueller and Morton 2002; Mueller 2007). Knapp
(2006) reports that all MoU’s focus on detentions only, ignore past incident information, and only
use their own inspection data for targeting vessels for inspection. Data-based policies involving
rich sets of risk factors for targeting vessels for inspection have been proposed by Knapp (2006),
Knapp and Franses (2007), and Li, Yin, and Fan (2014). Predictive approaches for PSC inspections
can be found in Heij, Bijwaard, and Knapp (2011) to improve vessel survival gains and in Yang,
Yang, and Yin (2018) to predict detention probabilities. Perepelkin et al. (2010) and Ji, Brinkhuis,
and Knapp (2015) advocate using incident data besides detention data to evaluate the safety
performance of registries. Luo and Shin (2019) conclude that the use of multiple data sources
including incident data helps in developing preventive policies to improve safety.
The employed data are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the methodology in terms of
a data-driven inspection protocol. This protocol is evaluated empirically in Section 4, and Section
5 concludes.
2. Employed databases
The empirical analysis builds on three diﬀerent databases that contain ship-particular character-
istics, inspections, and incidents of the world ﬂeet for three diﬀerent periods. The ﬁrst database
has yearly data from 2010 to 2014 and provides vessel-speciﬁc risk formulas for detentions and
incidents of various types (Knapp 2015). The second database applies for December 2017 and is
used to compute risk scores for each vessel from the risk formulas of the ﬁrst database. As it is
important to evaluate the out-of-sample predictive performance of the various risk classiﬁcation
methods, the third database has data from January to March 2018 to check whether the risk scores
for December 2017 of the second database have predictive power for detentions and incidents in
the next quarter.
The data sources are IHS Markit for ship-particulars and inspections and LLIS, IMO, and IHS
Markit for incidents. Inspection data are a combination of over seventy countries from eight
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MoUs and incident data are combined from the four mentioned sources to reduce under-
reporting. Since original data providers use diﬀerent deﬁnitions for the seriousness of incidents,
these data have been reclassiﬁed according to deﬁnitions of IMO (2000) for very serious (includ-
ing total loss), serious, and less serious. Besides this reclassiﬁcation, incident initial events were
identiﬁed when possible to classify the type of incident. The analysis is restricted to very serious
(including total loss) and serious (VSS) incidents and excludes less serious incidents and near
misses because the latter are relatively less relevant for maritime safety and may be less well
reported (Hassel, Asbjørnslett, and Hole 2011). Ship-particular data are available for about thirty
variables (and more than 500 when counting dummies for categorical variables), including
standard particulars such as ship type, age, size, and ﬂag, as well as owner, classiﬁcation society,
engine designer and builder, proxy variables for maritime expertise such as years in existence,
previous inspection and incident histories, and changes of ship-particulars. The included ship
types are general cargo, dry bulk, container, tanker, passenger, and other types excluding ﬁshing
and tugs.
The incident database for 2010–2014 contains 376,508 observations with (at most) one
observation per vessel per year (75,302 vessels on average per year, around 80% of commercial
vessels worldwide), with 8,874 VSS incidents. This database also contains information on the types
of incident shown in Table 1. The most common types for VSS incidents are drift grounding
(25%), collision (24%), powered grounding (20%), and main engine failure (20%), and less
common are ﬁre and explosion (11%), pollution (7%), hull failure (7%), and loss of life (4%).
Table 1 also shows risk domains associated with each incident type, which PSCs can use for
selecting domains of special importance when inspecting a vessel. This database is used in Section
3.2 to estimate the probability of VSS incidents and associated incident types at the level of
individual vessels.
The inspection database for 2010–2014 contains 158,187 inspections with 6,458 detentions and
can have multiple observations for the same vessel in the same year. This database contains on
average 21,117 inspected vessels per year, which corresponds to a vessel coverage rate compared
to the incident database of 30%. This database is used to estimate the probability of detention at
the level of individual vessels.
The database for January 2017 to March 2018 concerns 71,655 vessels. Inspection, detention, and
VSS incident outcomes for 2017 and for the ﬁrst quarter of 2018 (2018Q1) are shown in Table 2. The
yearly VSS incident rate has dropped considerably compared to 2010–2014. The much lower
inspection and detention rates compared to 2010–2014 are caused by the fact that the inspection
database for 2010–2014 concerns MoUs with relatively high inspection rates and covers only 30% of
the incident database. This causes no analysis problems, however, as the inspection database is used
Table 1. Incident types and associated risk domains.
Acronym Meaning Associated risk domains for inspection prioritization
VSS Very serious (incl. total loss) and serious All of below
COL Collision and grounding Passage planning, bridge management, crew qualiﬁcation
(includes navigation and communication failures)
DGR Drift grounding Main engine, emergency procedures
(includes failing propulsion, steering gear, anchor, and mooring)
ENG Main engine failure Main engine, emergency procedures
(includes camshaft, crankshaft, turbo charger, engine stoppage)
FIR Fire and explosion Fire related aspects, emergency procedures
HUL Hull failure Maintenace related issues including tanks and water integrity
(includes rudder and tank problems)
LIF Loss of life Occupational safety, safety management, life boats
PGR Powered grounding Passage planning, bridge management, crew qualiﬁcation
(includes wrecked, stranded, grounded, navigation, communication)
POL Pollution Pollution prevention and emergency response
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only to relate inspection and detention probabilities to vessel-speciﬁc characteristics and not to
predict inspection or detention rates. The database for January 2017 to March 2018 further contains
estimated probabilities of detention and VSS incidents and associated incident types per vessel
computed from information available in December 2017. The data for 2018Q1 are reserved for
policy evaluation purposes.
3. Methodology
This section presents a data-driven inspection protocol and describes statistical methods to
implement the four steps of this protocol.
3.1. Inspection protocol
The data-driven protocol consists of four consecutive steps.
Step 1. Estimate risk formulas that express probabilities of detention, VSS incidents, and eight
incident types in terms of vessel-speciﬁc risk factors. Section 3.2 derives these formulas from logit
models estimated from historical inspection and incident data for 2010–2014. As these formulas
are relatively stable over time and the regulatory framework relevant for port state control does
not change quickly, they can be updated at relatively low frequency, for example, once per 5 years.
This allows the industry to adapt to changes in the legislative framework and to account for other
changes such as the overall improvement of the industry.
Step 2. Use up-to-date information on current values of vessel-speciﬁc risk factors to determine
current probability scores by means of the formulas of Step 1. Section 3.3 describes how this is
done for December 2017. These scores can be computed relatively easily and can be updated
frequently, for example, monthly, weekly, or even daily.
Step 3. Determine the set of vessels eligible for inspection, for example, vessels currently in port or
also vessels expected to arrive shortly. Evaluate the relative detention and VSS incident risk scores of
Step 2 for each of these vessels and rank their risk by one or several classiﬁcation procedures, as
described in Section 3.4 and illustrated in Section 4.3. Determine which vessels will be inspected,
depending on their risk ranks, the available inspection capacity, and expert knowledge and other
relevant intelligence. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 evaluate how well the proposed classiﬁcation methods
succeed in predicting future detentions and VSS incidents from January to March 2018.
Step 4. For each of the vessels selected for inspection in Step 3, use the probabilities for eight
incident types determined in Step 1, combined with expert insights, to select priority areas for
inspection. This is described in Section 3.5 and illustrated in Section 4.3.
Table 2. Inspection, detention, and VSS incident rates in three periods.
Period 2010–2014 2017 2018Q1 (quarter) 2018Q1 (year)
VSS incidents
# Vessels 75,302 (A) 71,655 71,655 71,655
# VSS incidents 1,775 (A) 1,178 174 696 (C)
% VSS incidents per vessel 2.36 1.64 0.24 0.97
Inspections
# Vessels 21,117 (B) 71,655 71,655 71,655
# Inspections 31,637 (A) 81,085 15,868 63,472 (C)
% Inspections per vessel 149.82 113.16 22.15 88.58
# Detentions 1,292 (A) 1,977 480 1,920 (C)
% Detentions per vessel 6.12 2.76 0.67 2.68
% Detentions per inspection 4.08 2.44 3.02 3.02
*Code (A) means that 5-year total counts for 2010–2014 are divided by 5 to get average yearly ones.
*Code (B) gives the average of ﬁve yearly numbers of vessels in the inspection database.
*The column 2018Q1 (quarter) shows actual ﬁgures for this quarter, and 2018Q1 (year) inﬂates them to estimated yearly ﬁgures
by multiplying the quarterly ones by 4, denoted by code (C).
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3.2. Risk formulas
Step 1 of the protocol requires formulas that express probabilities of detention, VSS incidents, and
incident types in terms of vessel-speciﬁc risk factors. The incident and inspection databases for
2010–2014 are used to estimate logit models for each of these probabilities according to the metho-
dology described in Mueller and Morton (2002), Mueller (2007), Knapp (2006), Knapp and Franses
(2007), and Heij and Knapp (2018). Knapp (2015) describes this method for the current database in
more detail. Logit models express the probability (p) of an event (detention, VSS incident, or incident
type) bymeans of the fraction p = exp(xb)/(1+ exp(xb)), where ‘exp’ denotes the exponential function,
‘x’ is the set of vessel-speciﬁc risk factors such as age, size, ﬂag, and so on, and ‘xb’ is a weighted average
of these factors with estimated weights per factor. Initial models contain some thirty factors and have
more than 500 variables when counting dummies for categorical factors like ﬂag, owner, engine
designer and builder, and so on. These initial models are down-tested by removing insigniﬁcant
factors until all remaining factors and dummy variables are signiﬁcant (at 5% level). All models are
estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood (Greene 2008) to allow for possible misspeciﬁcation of the
assumed underlying distribution function for logit models. As the ﬂeet and maritime industry change
only gradually and it is rather challenging and time-consuming to update this database, it is
recommended to re-estimate the risk formulas, for example, once per 5 years.
Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the 10 obtained models. The logit models for incidents
are estimated for data with one observation per vessel per year. The logit model for detentions is
estimated on a sub-sample of vessels and can have multiple observations per vessel per year if the
vessel was inspected multiple times in that year. In general, models for more common events
contain more risk factors because data on such events are more informative. The richest model is
obtained for VSS incidents (8,874 events) and contains 15 scale variables such as age, size, and
past incident history, and 172 dummy variables for factors like ﬂag, engine designer and builder,
and ship type. The smallest model is for loss of life (376 events) and contains 7 scale variables and
26 dummy variables. As incident types are restricted to VSS incidents, it is not surprising that past
VSS incidents have positive eﬀects on most incident type probabilities. Past inspections and
detentions, however, are insigniﬁcant in most cases; the only exception, possibly by chance, is
a positive eﬀect of past inspections on powered grounding risk. This means that, given the other
vessel speciﬁcs including past incident history, the past inspection and detention history of the
vessel has no additional explanatory power for VSS incidents and associated incident types. Past
inspections reduce detention risk and past detentions increase this risk, as expected. However,
past incident history has no eﬀect on detention risk. The eﬀects of vessel age and size for VSS
incident risk are opposite to those for detention risk, as detention risk is higher for older and
smaller vessels whereas VSS incident risk is higher for newer and larger vessels. As the detention
model reﬂects actual MoU decisions in practice, these outcomes indicate that inspection and
detention policies in 2010–2014 did not incorporate incident information. This ﬁnding is directly
related to the main message of this paper that past incident information is relevant for targeting
vessels for inspection to reduce incident risk.
3.3. Current vessel-speciﬁc risk scores
Step 2 of the protocol is to compute up-to-date probabilities for detention and VSS incidents and
associated incident types using current information on vessel-speciﬁc risk factors. These prob-
abilities are obtained by substituting the current data into the logit probability formulas of step 1,
which requires data on the current age of the vessel, its current ﬂag and owner, its recent history
of inspections, detentions, and VSS incidents, and so on. These probabilities are computed from
information up to December 2017 by specialized software, including ﬁltering of vessels in service
at that time and resulting in 71,655 vessels. This software processes the raw data feeds, cleans the
data, and applies the formulas to estimate ship-speciﬁc probabilities.
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The computed model-based probabilities can be interpreted as yearly probabilities only after
calibration to correct for sample selection eﬀects in the underlying databases. As the vessel database
covers about 80% of the world commercial ﬂeet and VSS incidents may be under-reported, this means
that the incident database is incomplete with respect to both non-incident and incident observations.
Incident data come from four diﬀerent sources and are less under-reported than non-incident vessels,
which implies that the model-based probabilities overestimate annual incident risk. The calibration
needed to correct for these data defects is easily implemented for logit models. Let the database contain
fractions ‘f’ of all non-incidents and ‘g’ of all VSS incidents worldwide. Then, correct levels of VSS
incident probabilities are obtained from estimated logit probabilities exp(xb)/(1+ exp(xb)) by adding
the calibration factor a = ln(f/g) to xb, i.e., by using the formula p = exp(a+ xb)/(1+ exp(a+ xb)), where
‘ln’ denotes the natural logarithm. This result is shown in Franses and Paap (2010, pp. 73–75) in case
the database contains all events (g = 1) but under-reports non-events (f < 1) and is easily extended in
case also the events are under-reported (g < 1). For our data, f < g < 1 so that a < 0, which results in
downward correction of the estimated probabilities. Comparison of estimated VSS incident prob-
abilities with empirically observedVSS incident rates shows that sample selection eﬀects diﬀer per ship
type. The resulting calibration factors for VSS incidents and associated incident types are (rounded to
two decimals) a = −0.22 for dry bulk vessels, a = −0.08 for passenger ships, a = −0.04 for general cargo
vessels, a = −0.03 for tankers, and a = −0.01 for container ships and for other ship types.
Calibration along similar lines of estimated detention probabilities is hard because the inspec-
tion database covers only a limited part of the global ﬂeet and contains multiple inspections of the
same vessel in the same year. Estimated detention probabilities in December 2017 are 6.45% on
average, whereas the empirical detention rate over 2017 is 2.76%. The logit detention probabilities
are divided by 2 to match them roughly to empirical rates. This crude scaling is done only for
intuitive interpretation of the estimated detention probabilities. This scaling does not aﬀect the
analysis in any sense because it is not based on numerical values of the probabilities but on
percentile ranks that are scale independent.
3.4. Combining detention and incident risk
In step 3 of the protocol, vessels are ranked according to their risk scores computed in step 2. In
practice, this ranking can be done for any subset of vessels of interest, but here this is done for the
full set of vessels. To prevent diﬃculties in the interpretation of numerical levels of probabilities,
they are transformed into relative scores by means of percentile rank scores. If, for example,
a vessel has rank score 83 for VSS incident risk, this means that 83% of the vessels have lower risk
and 17% have a higher risk for a VSS incident. Rank scores are computed for the full set of 71,655
vessels and rank from 0 for the least risky vessel to 100 for the most risky one.
The rank scores of each vessel are denoted by RDET for detention and by RVSS for VSS
incidents. Two simple ranking methods are to rank vessel risk by RDET neglecting incident risk
or by RVSS neglecting detention risk. Figure 1 shows three methods to combine these two risk
dimensions, where the combined detention and incident risk is ranked according to the highest of
the two ranks (method A), the lowest (method B), or their average (method C). By construction,
percentile ranks of vessels are distributed uniformly across both axes. The ﬁgure also shows ﬁve
quintile areas for each method, labelled from 1 for least risky to 5 for most risky. Each quintile
contains 20% of all vessels if the two risk dimensions are independent. The fraction of the (100 ×
100) square occupied by area 1A, for example, is 0.447 × 0.447 = 0.2, that of area 1B is 2 ×
0.106–0.106 × 0.106 = 0.2, and that of area 1C is 0.632 × 0.632/2 = 0.2. RDET and RVSS computed
in December 2017 for the set of 71,655 vessels are nearly completely uncorrelated (correlation
0.002) and the percentage of vessels in the ﬁve areas of Figure 1 ranges from 19.5% to 20.2% for
method A, 19.6% to20.3% for method B, and 19.1% to21.0% for method C. The class of most risky
vessels in the top quintile is of special interest and area 5A has 20.2% of the vessels, 5B has 20.1%,
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and 5C has 19.6%. The empirical analysis in Section 4 will always use exact quintiles with
boundaries that diﬀer slightly from those in Figure 1.
As method C uses the average of rank scores of detention and VSS incidents, this corresponds to
assigning equal weights to these two risk dimensions. Another option is to leave the selection of
weights to regulators, see also Ji, Brinkhuis, and Knapp (2015). One can also follow an empirical
approach. For example, a logit model for VSS incidents in 2017 assigns weights of about 2 for RVSS
and −1 for RDET, a rather peculiar outcome that indicates once again that past inspection policies do
not succeed well in targeting incident risk. This method is infeasible in real time, however, because
the rank scores RVSS and RDET are computed with information of December 2017 and can hence
not be used to predict VSS incidents in 2017. Estimation of weights based on past predictive
performance becomes feasible when longer evaluation periods become available.
3.5. Inspection priorities
If inspection capacity is limited, then inspection eﬀorts can be focused mostly on vessels in the
highest risk quintiles. For example, if 20% of all vessels can be inspected, then vessels in the top
quintiles 5A, 5B, or 5C are prime targets.
In step 4 of the protocol, for a given set of vessels selected for inspection, risk domains
deserving special attention can be determined per vessel based on probabilities for the eight
incident types of Table 1. For each vessel, inspectors can check percentile rank scores per risk
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Figure 1. Three risk classiﬁcation methods for combining the risk of detention and the risk of a VSS incident. The axes show the
rank (scale from 0 for lowest to 100 for highest) of two risk indicators: VSS incident probability and detention probability.
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domain and decide which domains get inspection priority. The risk domains listed in Table 1
include bridge management, passage planning, crew quality, maintenance issues related to engine
and hull, occupational safety, emergency procedures, and pollution prevention. In principle, these
risk domains can be extended and reﬁned if more detailed incident type information becomes
available with a suﬃcient number of events to construct reliable probability models.
As the eight incident types of Table 1 are analyzed for VSS incidents, it is not surprising that
the risk for each type increases per risk quintile. Figure 2 shows average yearly probabilities (on
the vertical axis) for each incident type, computed in December 2017 for the set of 71,655 vessels,
per risk quintile (on the horizontal axis, with 14.331 vessels per quintile) and for each risk
combination method. It also shows average yearly detention probabilities per quintile, which
are divided by 10 to get comparable vertical axis scales. All eight incident types have highest
average probability in the top quintiles (5A, 5B, 5C), with roughly 2–3 times larger risk than
average. Method A is more successful than method B in classifying vessels with the highest
incident type risks in its top quintile, whereas method C takes a kind of middle position. The table
in Figure 2 shows that engine failures and powered and drift groundings are expected to occur
most frequently for future VSS incidents. Although the expected frequencies of loss of life,
pollution, and ﬁre and explosion are relatively small, these types of incident have of course
serious consequences. The analysis in this paper will, therefore, transform probabilities into
percentile rank scores that show the risk position of a vessel relative to the global ﬂeet.
4. Results
This section investigates the predictive out-of-sample performance of the ﬁve risk classiﬁcation
methods of Section 3.4 in detecting future risk for VSS incidents. The risk scores of each vessel are
determined from logit formulas with weights of risk factors estimated for 2010–2014 (see Section 3.2)
and by substituting up-to-date values of these risk factors that apply for December 2017 (see Section
3.3). Performance of the ﬁvemethods is evaluated for inspections, detentions, andVSS incidents in the
forecast period January to March 2018 (2018Q1). It is shown that the four methods that include VSS
incident risk (RVSS and methods A, B, and C) provide signiﬁcant information for future VSS
incidents, whereas the method based on detention risk alone (RDET) has no predictive value. This
ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by comparing the number of VSS incidents in high-risk classes with those in low-
risk classes (Section 4.1) and by determining hit rates of vessels with future VSS incidents when each
method is used to target vessels for inspections (Section 4.2). A small management example with 12
vessels illustrates how the proposed methods can be applied in practice to select vessels for inspection
and to determine domains of attention during inspections (Section 4.3).
4.1. Predictive power of risk classiﬁcation methods
To assist inspection decisions, the risk of each vessel is ranked relative to a reference group of
vessels. In this application, the reference group consists of 71,655 vessels distributed as follows
over vessel types: 26% general cargo, 22% tanker, 16% dry bulk, 9% passenger, 7% container, and
20% other excluding ﬁshing and tugs. For each vessel, its probabilities of detention and VSS
incidents are determined from data up to December 2017 (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and these
probabilities are transformed into percentile rank scores RDET for detention and RVSS for VSS
incidents. Incident risk is unrelated to detention risk, with correlation −0.03 for the two prob-
abilities and 0.002 for the percentiles RDET and RVSS, showing that past inspection and
detention decisions did not account for incident risk. Five vessel risk ranking methods are
compared: RDET and RVSS that consider only a single risk dimension, and methods A, B, and
C that combine these two dimensions (see Section 3.4 and Figure 1). For each method, vessels are
classiﬁed into ﬁve risk groups, that is, ﬁve quintiles that each contains 20% of all vessels (14,331).
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Quintile VSS DET ENG PGR DGR COL HUL FIR POL LIF
All (1-5) 0.78 3.22 0.56 0.32 0.29 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00
5A 2.17 6.01 1.36 0.92 0.72 0.32 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.03
5B 1.57 5.25 0.95 0.76 0.54 0.21 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.03
5C 1.91 5.55 1.16 0.88 0.65 0.26 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.01
Highest A A A A A A C A C A
Lowest B B B B B B B B B C
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Figure 2. Means of incident type probabilities per risk quintile for three risk classiﬁcation methods. In each ﬁgure, the bottom
three curves below ‘HUL’ are (from top to bottom) for FIR, POL, and LIF. The table shows the mean percentage risk (probability
times 100) for vessels in the top quintile (top 20%) for each method, as well as the gross mean percentage over all vessels (all
quintiles 1-5).
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The bottom quintile contains the 20% of vessels with the lowest risk and the top quintile contains
the 20% with the highest risk.
Figure 3 shows empirical rates of inspections, detentions, and VSS incidents in 2018Q1 within
each quintile (on the horizontal axis) and for each method. These event rates are shown as
percentages on the vertical axis, so that a value of 1 means that 1% of the vessels in this quintile
had this type of event at least once in 2018Q1. These percentages are most precise for inspections
(12,791 vessels, 2,558 per quintile), followed by detentions (462 vessels, 92 per quintile), and they
are least precise for VSS incidents (173 vessels, 35 per quintile). These vessel counts diﬀer from
the counts for 2018Q1 in Table 2 because vessels can have multiple events. For example, one
vessel had two VSS incidents and 172 vessels had one such incident, so the total number of VSS
incidents is 174 and the number of involved vessels is 173.
The graph for detentions shows that actual detention rates during the forecast period increase
for higher quintiles. This agrees with the idea that the chance of detention should be higher for
riskier vessels. Methods B and C have the highest detention rate in their top quintile, so these two
methods are most successful in predicting high detention risk.
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Figure 3. Rates of inspections, detentions, and VSS incidents in 2018Q1 for ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods.
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The graph for inspections shows that inspection rates increase per risk class for methods RVSS and B,
ﬂuctuate for method C, and decline for methods RDET and A. The results for RVSS and B are rather
weak, as inspection rates are ﬂat across the highest three quintiles. The results for A and especially for
RDET indicate that these methods do not correspond with actual inspections in 2018Q1. Stated
otherwise, inspections in 2018Q1 were only weakly related to VSS incident risk and even negatively to
detention risk. The actual inspection rate in the highest detention risk quintile for RDET is only 8.6%,
less than half of the average inspection rate of 21.7% in the three lowest detention risk quintiles.
The graph for VSS incidents shows haphazard patterns due to the relatively small number of
VSS incidents in 2018Q1. However, method RVSS shows a clear upward trend and all methods
except RDET have clearly higher VSS incident rates in the top quintile compared to the bottom
quintile. Incident rates for RDET are rather ﬂat or even declining for higher risk, showing that
detention risk alone is not well related to future VSS incident risk.
The visual comparisons in Figure 3 are supported by statistical tests on the research
hypothesis that future inspection, detention, and VSS incident rates are higher for vessels
falling in higher risk classes. Note that these risk classes have been determined ‘ex ante’, that is,
from past data up to December 2017 and prior to the events in the evaluation period 2018Q1.
The test outcomes are shown in Table 3. Outcomes under ‘Event yes/no’ compare median risk
rank scores in two groups of vessels, those with the event of interest (inspection, detention, or
VSS incident) and those without. A standard test for rank comparison between two groups is
the rank-sum test of Wilcoxon (1945) for equal medians. The table shows the diﬀerence
between the median rank score in the group with events from that without events, so that
positive values are expected. The reported p-values are for the two-sided alternative that
median ranks diﬀer in the two groups.
The results for detentions are as expected, with a higher risk for detained vessels compared to
non-detained ones. For all ﬁve methods, ‘ex ante’ detention risk signals future detention risk. This
signal is strongest for method B, followed by C, RDET, RVSS, and ﬁnally A. The results for VSS
incidents are also as expected, except for RDET. The strongest signal for future VSS incidents is
provided by methods RVSS and C, followed by B, and that of A is small and only marginally
Table 3. Ex ante risk classiﬁcations and ex post outcomes for inspections, detentions, and incidents during 2018Q1.
INS (12,791 = 17.85%) DET (462 = 0.64%) VSS (173 = 0.24%)
Risk method Test Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value Diﬀ P-value
Event yes/no
RDET W −10.87 0.000 14.71 0.000 −0.27 0.826
RVSS W 7.74 0.000 12.19 0.000 12.61 0.000
A W −11.41 0.000 9.55 0.000 2.12 0.066
B W 5.39 0.000 21.67 0.000 8.48 0.004
C W −3.85 0.000 18.66 0.000 12.43 0.005
Quintile 5/1
RDET T −11.39 0.000 0.69 0.000 −0.05 0.392
RVSS T 9.78 0.000 0.61 0.000 0.20 0.001
A T −8.81 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.13 0.017
B T 5.18 0.000 1.00 0.000 0.20 0.001
C T −2.62 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.12 0.049
Quintile 4–5/1–2
RDET T 0.69 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.00 0.933
RVSS T 6.20 0.000 0.46 0.000 0.18 0.000
A T −8.07 0.000 0.30 0.000 0.06 0.170
B T 4.39 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.07 0.098
C T −2.34 0.000 0.50 0.000 0.13 0.002
*Test W is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal medians and test T is the Satterthwaite test for equal percentages.
*For ‘Event yes/no’, ‘Diﬀ’ shows by how much the median percentile rank score of vessels with event exceeds that of vessels
without event, and for the two quintile comparisons ‘Diﬀ’ shows by how much the percentage of events of vessels in the
higher risk class exceeds that of vessels in the lower risk class.
*Bold numbers are for the classiﬁcation method providing the sharpest contrast.
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signiﬁcant. Method RDET is not successful, as the median risk rank for vessels with VSS incident
is even slightly lower than that of vessels without incident. Finally, the results for inspections are
mixed because inspections in 2018Q1 were more likely for vessels with higher incident risk but
less likely for vessels with higher detention risk. The median ‘ex ante’ VSS incident risk rank of
inspected vessels (56.21) is higher than that of non-inspected ones (48.46), but the median
detention risk rank of inspected vessels (41.61) is lower than that of non-inspected ones (52.48).
Another way to test the predictive power of risk classiﬁcation methods is to compare event
rates (of inspections, detentions, and VSS incidents) in high-risk classes with those in low-risk
classes. The research hypothesis is that the event rate, measured as the percentage of vessels that
has the event in 2018Q1, is higher for higher risk classes. Table 3 shows the diﬀerence of event
percentages between the highest and lowest risk class, so that positive values are expected.
A standard test for the comparison of percentages in two groups is the t-test of Satterthwaite
(1946), and p-values reported in Table 3 are for the two-sided alternative that event percentages
diﬀer between the two groups. This test is implemented in two ways, one comparing the 20% most
risky vessels (quintile 5) with the 20% least risky ones (quintile 1) and another comparing the 40%
most risky vessels (quintiles 4 and 5) with the 40% least risky ones (quintiles 1 and 2).
The outcomes support earlier ﬁndings. For all ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods, detention rates
are higher in the higher risk group with the largest diﬀerence for method B. As expected, the
diﬀerence for quintile 5 compared to 1 is sharper than that for quintiles 4 and 5 compared to 1
and 2. For method B, for example, the detention rate, which is 0.64% for all vessels, is 1.30% in
quintile 5 against 0.31% in quintile 1, and 1.05% in quintiles 4 and 5 against 0.31% in quintiles 1
and 2. The results for inspection rates are again rather mixed. The overall vessel inspection
percentage in 2018Q1 is 17.85%, but only 8.60% of vessels in the highest detention risk quintile is
inspected compared to 19.99% in the lowest one. Inspection rates are higher for vessels with
higher VSS incident risk, 20.07% in quintile 1 against 10.29% in quintile 5 and 20.27% in quintiles
4 and 5 against 14.07% in quintiles 1 and 2. Finally, VSS incident rates are signiﬁcantly higher for
higher risk classes except for method RDET. At an overall incident rate of 0.24%, the rate in the
highest (lowest) quintile is 0.33% (0.14%) for RVSS, 0.33% (0.13%) for method B, 0.29% (0.15%)
for method A, 0.32% (0.20%) for method C, and 0.21% (0.26%) for RDET. This shows that all
methods except RDET succeed rather well in signalling future risk for serious and very serious
incidents, as this risk is about twice as large for vessels in the top quintile compared to the bottom
quintile.
4.2. Hit rates for VSS incidents at various inspection rates
The main purpose of inspections is to prevent future incidents. The success of inspection
strategies to target vessels with future VSS incidents can be measured in terms of the hit rate,
deﬁned as the targeted percentage of vessels with future VSS incidents relative to the overall
percentage of vessels targeted for inspection. For example, if 50 out of 1,000 vessels have an
incident and a strategy selects 200 vessels for inspection 30 of which have an incident, then the hit
rate is equal to (30/50) divided by (200/1000), that is, 3. Random strategies unrelated to incidents
are expected to have a hit rate of 1, and hit rates above 1 indicate successful targeting.
The ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods are applied to the set of 71,655 vessels with risk scores
computed from information up to December 2017 (see Section 3.3). Now suppose that R% of
these vessels can be inspected, then the best way to do this from a risk perspective point of view is
to select the vessels with the highest R% of risk scores. The hit rates for VSS incidents in 2018Q1
are shown in Table 4 for each method and for quarterly inspection rates ranging from 5% to
100%. For a quarterly inspection rate of 20%, for example, all vessels are inspected that fall in the
highest quintile, that is, with a risk percentile score above 80. The number of vessel hits in the
table shows how many of the 173 vessels with a VSS incident in 2018Q1 are selected for inspection
in this way. Method ‘Random’ is a benchmark rule that selects vessels arbitrarily for inspection,
MARITIME POLICY & MANAGEMENT 877
and the reported numbers of vessel hits for this method are expected outcomes. For a quarterly
inspection rate of 20%, methods RVSS, B, and C have hit rates above 1.3, meaning they do more
than 30% better than random. Methods B and C perform best for smaller inspection rates, with hit
rates up to 50% better than random. Method RDET does not perform well and does not outper-
form the random benchmark, whereas methods RVSS, B, and C increase the hit rate by 30–50%
for yearly inspection rates of about 20–60%. Method A is also better than random but performs
less well than RVSS, B, and C.
These results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that inspection policies based on detention risk alone are
not successful in targeting risky vessels, whereas incorporation of VSS incident risk improves this
targeting considerably. The above risk-based strategies depend solely on quantitative information,
and the involved set of risk factors consists of all factors incorporated in the logit risk formulas
described in Section 3.2 (see also Table A1 in the Appendix). In practice, inspection decisions
involve an interplay of such quantitative information with qualitative expert knowledge and local
considerations. The above analysis considers a simpliﬁed situation where inspections are based
only on quantitative risk information and shows the potential power for improved inspection
strategies apart from the evident importance of other information and considerations in the
ultimate decision process.
The results in this and the previous subsection indicate that RDET does not perform well and
that methods B and RVSS perform best on average, followed by C and A. It is, therefore,
recommended to include incident risk in making inspection decisions and, if also detention risk
is included, to focus on vessels where both risks are relatively high (method B).
4.3. Application example for inspection management
A small example with 12 real-world vessels is used to illustrate the proposed methods as
a quantitative ingredient of the wider decision process which vessels to inspect. The risk formulas
estimated from the database for 2010–2014 data and the vessel-speciﬁc information of
December 2017 are used to calculate risk ranks relative to the world ﬂeet. These risk ranks form
the basis for selecting vessels for inspection and for determining inspection priorities. Figure 4
depicts the percentile rank scores RDET for detention and RVSS for incidents of the 12 vessels. The
table shows for each vessel its two rank scores, whether it had an inspection, detention, or VSS
incident in 2018Q1, the quintile scores of ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods, and the percentile scores
Table 4. VSS incident hit rates during 2018Q1 for various risk-based inspection methods.
Inspection rate (%) Expected inspections Risk ranking method
Quarterly Yearly Quarterly Yearly Random RDET RVSS A B C
Number of vessel hits
5 18.5 0.05 0.2 8.65 10 10 11 12 13
10 34.4 0.1 0.4 17.3 17 23 19 25 26
20 59.0 0.2 0.8 34.6 30 48 41 47 46
40 87.0 0.4 1.6 69.2 70 93 76 83 92
60 97.4 0.6 2.4 103.8 102 132 113 110 118
80 99.8 0.8 3.2 138.4 136 153 151 154 144
100 100.0 1.0 4.0 173 173 173 173 173 173
Hit rate
5 18.5 0.05 0.2 1.00 1.16 1.16 1.27 1.39 1.50
10 34.4 0.1 0.4 1.00 0.98 1.33 1.10 1.45 1.50
20 59.0 0.2 0.8 1.00 0.87 1.39 1.18 1.36 1.33
40 87.0 0.4 1.6 1.00 1.01 1.34 1.10 1.20 1.33
60 97.4 0.6 2.4 1.00 0.98 1.27 1.09 1.06 1.14
80 99.8 0.8 3.2 1.00 0.98 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.04
100 100.0 1.0 4.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
*The yearly inspection rate is derived from the quarterly one with the assumption that selection for inspection is independent
across quarters; for quarterly inspection rate r = R/100, the probability to be inspected at least once in a year is 1—(1-r)^4.
*‘Expected inspections’ is the expected number of inspections for each vessel.
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for eight incident types. It is now shown how this information can be used for steps 3 and 4 of the
inspection protocol to identify high-risk vessels and inspection domains of interest.
Vessels 1 and 3 to 6 (two tankers, two dry bulk vessels, and a general cargo vessel) were in fact
inspected in 2018Q1 and vessel 6 (general cargo) was detained, but none of these vessels had
a VSS incident (‘false positives’). The risk classiﬁcation methods assign low risk quintiles to these
ﬁve vessels, suggesting that these inspections had low priority. However, vessel 6 has a high risk
for some incident types, especially for powered grounding, engine failure, and pollution, which
may justify its inspection and detention. Vessels 2 (dry bulk), 7 (passenger ship), and 12 (general
cargo) were not inspected, and the classiﬁcation methods agree with this decision for vessel 2 but
not for vessel 12 and, to a lesser degree, also not for vessel 7 which has a high risk for loss of life.
The decision not to inspect vessel 2 is correct in the sense that it had no VSS incident (‘correct
negative’), but vessels 7 and 12 did have such an incident in 2018Q1 (‘false negatives’). Vessel 12
has top priority for each of the ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods, and it would not have been missed
for an inspection rate of 20% which is comparable to the actual inspection rate during 2018Q1,
which is 22.15% on average and involves 17.85% of all vessels. Vessels 8 to 11 (two container
ships, a tanker, and a general cargo vessel) were inspected but not detained and all of these vessels
had a VSS incident in 2018Q1 (‘correct positives’). For an inspection rate of 20%, four of the ﬁve
RDET RVSS VSS INS DET RDET RVSS A B C COL DGR ENG FIR HUL LIF PGR POL
Scale
V1 10 21 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 36 40 53 47 10 61 14 48
V2 30 16 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 16 26 45 4 4 34 14 39
V3 48 7 0 1 0 3 1 2 1 1 2 35 28 0 41 31 1 51
V4 17 42 0 1 0 1 3 1 2 1 62 58 60 30 9 45 16 45
V5 31 31 0 1 0 2 2 1 3 1 39 38 58 14 11 32 50 39
V6 11 77 0 1 1 1 4 3 2 2 66 59 86 40 41 59 89 81
V7 68 48 1 0 0 4 3 3 4 4 11 17 4 58 69 89 42 40
V8 44 80 1 1 0 3 5 4 4 4 80 53 62 35 25 37 83 30
V9 48 90 1 1 0 3 5 5 4 5 90 86 90 82 64 49 85 39
V10 92 64 1 1 0 5 4 5 5 5 40 30 41 67 67 59 47 73
V11 76 94 1 1 0 4 5 5 5 5 78 58 68 76 71 67 73 93
V12 87 91 1 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 93 95 95 67 59 55 92 34
Quintile
(0-100) (1 = yes, 0 = no) (1 = lowest to 5 = highest) (0 = lowest to 100 = highest)
PercentileEventPercentile
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
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Figure 4. Risk indicators, inspections, and targeting strategies for a set of 12 vessels.
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risk classiﬁcation methods would have signalled inspection for vessels 10 and 11, three for vessel 9,
and one for vessel 8. For this inspection rate, methods RVSS, A, and C succeed in selecting four of
the six vessels with a VSS incident, B selects three of them, and RDET two. Again, the incorpora-
tion of VSS incident risk helps in signalling vessels with high future incident risk.
Once vessels have been selected for inspection, the percentile scores of incident types can be
used to identify inspection domains of special interest. Vessels 9–12 have top risk and would be
selected for inspection by almost all classiﬁcation methods. The incident type risk of vessel 9,
a container ship, belongs to the top 20% of all vessels in the following ﬁve risk domains (see
Figure 4): collision, engine failure, powered and drift grounding, and ﬁre and explosion.
Inspection of this vessel can put priority on these domains. Vessel 10 is a tanker and has high
detention risk and quite high VSS incident risk, but incident type risks are quite ﬂat across the
eight domains so it is not easy to set priorities for this vessel. Vessel 11 is a general cargo vessel
and has a top risk for pollution and quite evenly spread moderately high risk for all other incident
types, which makes it hard to set inspection priorities apart from pollution. Vessel 12 is also
a general cargo vessel with high risk in nearly all domains except pollution, with the highest risks
for collision, powered and drift grounding, and engine failure.
5. Conclusion
Inspections play a key role in protecting the marine environment and in enhancing maritime
safety. This paper proposes a four-step protocol for quantitative support of inspection targeting
decisions that can be useful, for instance, for beneﬁcial owner or safety management companies.
The ﬁrst two steps consist of using rich information sets to identify risk on the level of individual
vessels for various risk dimensions, with detention risk and incident risk as the two primary
dimensions and the risk of eight incident types as secondary dimensions. The last two steps
consist of ranking vessels according to the ﬁrst two dimensions to select vessels for inspection and
of determining risk domains deserving special attention during inspections. The proposed meth-
odology is illustrated by an empirical application using three databases on vessel particulars,
inspections, detentions, and incident types. The ﬁrst database for 2010–2014 is used to estimate
the risk formulas for step 1 of the protocol, the second one for December 2017 gives up-to-date
risk values for step 2, and the third one for the ﬁrst quarter of 2018 evaluates the out-of-sample
predictive performance of ﬁve risk classiﬁcation methods for steps 3 and 4. In practice, the ﬁrst
database can be updated with relatively low frequency (e.g. once per 5 years), whereas this
frequency should be higher for the second database (e.g. once per quarter) and for the third
database (e.g. monthly, weekly, or even daily, depending on available data updates).
The outcomes show that current inspection strategies that are based mainly on detention risk can
be considerably improved by also incorporating incident risk. Such extended methods produce
signiﬁcant signals for future risk of serious and very serious incidents, as the out-of-sample frequency
of these incidents is twice as large for vessels with large (top 20%) risk compared to those with small
(bottom 20%) risk. These extended methods also increase the hit rate of vessels with future VSS
incidents, which for detention-based inspection methods are no better than random but which
increase by 30–50% by incorporating incident risk for yearly inspection rates of 20–60%. The general
recommendation is to include incident risk in making inspection decisions and, if also detention risk
is included, to focus on vessels where both risks are relatively high (risk classiﬁcation method B).
The methodology and empirical analysis presented in this paper can be extended in several
ways if more data become available. In the application of the inspection protocol for the ﬁrst
quarter of 2018, the risk scores of each vessel stay ﬁxed as determined in step 2 for
December 2017. This can be improved by repeating step 2 more frequently, for example, monthly,
weekly, or even daily to incorporate the most recent vessel information, in particular on recent
inspections, detentions, and incidents. Further, the presented analysis is based on percentile ranks
relating to the full set of vessels. It may be of interest to apply some or all steps of the protocol for
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smaller subsets of vessels, for example, per ship type or per inspection region, to tune inspection
priorities more closely to the vessels of prime interest. No information on the incident types of
Table 1 was available for the application in the ﬁrst quarter of 2018, and it is of interest to add this
information to evaluate how well the proposed methods succeed in signalling speciﬁc incident
type risk. Another extension of interest is to reﬁne the incident types and risk domains to deliver
more detailed targeting suggestions for inspections, which would require more reﬁned informa-
tion on the precise causes of each incident.
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